Abstract-The "weak" relay-eavesdropper channel was first studied by Lai and El Gamal, whose achievable scheme introduced noise forwarding (NF) and used backward decoding. We suggest a novel sliding window decoding scheme with a two block decoding delay, where the relay uses compress-forward with Wyner-Ziv (WZ) binning but does not use NF. Wireless engineers will welcome the reduced decoding delay. Sliding window decoding mandates multiblock equivocation calculations; dispensing with NF enables it. We identify nine regimes and develop a case-by-case choice of relay channel codebook and WZ bin sizes to maximize the secrecy rate. The multiblock equivocation calculations may be of independent interest.
II. MODEL: "WEAK" RELAY-EAVESDROPPER CHANNEL
The notation is standard, but we describe it here for completeness. The system model is depicted in Fig. 1 . We assume a two receiver discrete memoryless relay-eavesdropper channel with a confidential message intended for one of the receivers, with the other acting as an eavesdropper. The finite sets X 1 , X 2 , Y 2 , Y 3 , Z respectively represent the channel's input at node 1 (the transmitter), at node 2 (the relay), the channel's output at nodes 2, 3 (legitimate receiver aka Bob) and 4 (eavesdropper aka Eve). Finally,Ŷ 2 represents the alphabet of the compression random variable. The channel is described by the conditional probability distribution P Y2,Y3,Z|X1,X2 , where RVs X i ∈ X i , i = 1, 2 and Y i ∈ Y i , i = 2, 3 and Z ∈ Z. The transmitter intends to send an independent message W ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2 nR1 } ∆ = W to the receiver Rx Y 3 in n channel uses while ensuring information theoretic secrecy, defined below. The channel is memoryless and without feedback i.e. ∀(x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ 2 t=1 X n t , y t ∈ Y n t , t = 2, 3, z ∈ Z n , P (y 2 , y 3 , z|x 1 , x 2 ) = n i=1 P Y2,Y3,Z|X1,X2 (y 2i , y 3i , z i |x 1i , x 2i )
The decoding function at Bob ≡ Y 3 is a map φ 3 :
e ) code for the relay-eavesdropper channel with compress-forward (CF) consists of a (stochastic) encoding function at the Tx and an encoding function at the relay, and a decoding function φ 3 at the destination and error probability P A secrecy rate R 1 is said to be achievable for the DM relayeavesdropper channel if, for any ǫ > 0, ∃(2 n[R1+R1] , n, P (n) e ) code s.t. the following requirements are satisfied:
We use the notation [x]
+ def = max{x, 0}.
III. INNER BOUND
The main result of our paper is presented below, namely, that judicious independent choice of the compression sequence ratê R and WZ binning rateR − R 2 , 1 enables us to maximize the secrecy rate. Theorem 1. We first define:
A (pure secrecy) rate R 1 is achievable if there exists distributions P X1 P X2 PŶ 2 |X2,Y2 s.t. the following hold:
. So Eve cannot uniquely decode x 2 , and either decodes it nonuniquely or treats it as noise, depending on the sub-cases.
The choices R 2 = max{I(X 2 ; Y 3 ), I(X 2 ; Z)}+ǫ,R as before,
The penalty term can be reduced by choosing
can be made consistent and enable secrecy rate
The penalty term is reduced by choosing
IV. ACHIEVABILITY SCHEME As is common in secrecy scenarios, the transmitter's codebook is divided into bins (aka subcodebooks), with the bin size intended to confuse Eve. We use [4] 's decoding technique.
Codebook Generation: There are B blocks of transmission. An independent set of codebooks is generated for each block, and these are known to all parties involved. Aside from an additional binning structure, the codebook construction at the transmitter is almost identical to that in the canonical relay channel [2] , [8] . The transmitter codebook in block b is given by C
])}, with the codewords generated independently using distribution
] can be thought of as a bin. The relay channel codebook C (b) 2 and compression codebook associated with each relay channel codeword is exactly identical to that in [2] , [8] .
nR2 . The compression codebook consists of 2 nR2 -i.e., one per relay codeword -satellite codebooks; each is of size 2 nR , and is divided into 2 nR2 WZ bins of size ] . The generation of the codewords is identical to that in [2] , [8] and is omitted due to space. See [9] for details.
Remark 2.
There are two differences with the codebooks used for NF and GNF in [1] . In [1] ] in a block b ∈ 1, 2, . . . , B − 1, the transmitter chooses uniformly at random from among 2 nR1 possibilities forw inside the corresponding bin W j . The corresponding codeword x 1 is transmitted. Relay Encoding: The relay encoding is standard [2] , [8] i.e. it looks for a compression codeword that satisfies the joint typicality condition x 2 ,ŷ 2 , y 2 ∈ T (n) ǫ and then determineŝ y 2 's WZ bin index. The relay codeword corresponding to this WZ bin is transmitted in the next block. Decoding at Bob: We use the decoding techniques developed by [4] . See [9] . These give rise to:
Remark 3. Consider the canonical "weak" relay with no secrecy requirement i.e.,R 1 = 0, as in [4] . We observe that: [4] , [5] ). 
i.e., single block information to decode x 2 , and then conditions on x 2 to decode x 1 using 
(a), 2(b)(ii). Calculation for 2(b)(i) is identical to Case 2(a).
In this regime, we will always chooseR ∈ (I(X 2 ; Z) + W Z Eve , I(X 2 ; Y 3 ) + W Z Bob ), and R 2 > I(X 2 ; Z). We s.t. Term (2)(ii) "small". The rate of a transmitter bin is R 1 ≈ I(X 1 ; Z)I{R 2 > I(X 2 ; Z|X 2 )} + [I(X 1 , X 2 ; Z) − R 2 ]I{R 2 ∈ (I(X 2 ; Z), I(X 2 ; Z|X 1 ))}. Conditioning on transmitted W j is equivalent to knowing the bin and reduces the number of possibilities for X 1,j from 2 n[R1+R1] to 2 nR1 , and knowing Z j , enables us to decode X 1,j inside the bin correctly whp, using, in every block j = 1, 2, . . . , B − 1:
i.e. treating x 2,j as noise if R 2 > I(X 2 ; Z|X 1 ).
• or (x 1,j , x 2,j , z(j)) ∈ T (n) ǫ for a unique x 1 and some x 2 at a rate I(X 1 , X 2 ; Z)−R 2 if R 2 ∈ (I(X 2 ; Z), I(X 2 ; Z|X 1 )).
In the last block no new message is transmitted and thus X 1,B is known. A standard application of Fano's inequality gives: Term (2)(ii) ≤ (B − 1) × nǫ.
is a function of (X 2,j−1 ,Ŷ 2,j−1 ) present in the conditioning.
codewords; choice unaffected by the conditioning.
The first three quantities in the conditioning, namely, (X 1 , X 2 , Z) j can be used to reduce the number of possibilities forŷ 2,j as follows. Knowledge of X 2,j reduces the number of possibilities for the compression sequence down to 2 nR . Now by the condition x 1,j , x 2,j ,ŷ 2 (|x 2,j ), z j ∈ T (n) ǫ , we can create an equiprobable list of size 2 n[R−I(Ŷ2;X1,Z|X2)] .
Term (9) 
. Conditioning on (X 2,j , X 1,j , Z j ) gives us a further reduction by: 2 nI(Ŷ2;X1,Z|X2) so that, finally, the Term
We now lower bound the RHS of (12) by first computing two upper bounds for I(X 1,j , X 2,j ; Z j ). We have (see [3] and [10] )
We use the above to obtain a lower bound for the RHS of (12) to obtain, for a single block:
and the above becomes nR 1 − nǫ.
• If R 2 ∈ (I(X 2 ; Z), I(X 2 ; Z|X 1 )), thenR 1 = I(X 1 , X 2 ; Z) − R 2 , and we again have nR 1 − nǫ.
Using this lower bound for RHS of (12) in (14), summing over all B blocks and noting that the Bth block does not contribute, and using the lower bound on (2)(ii) , we get
Case 2:
form a Markov chain. Conditioning on (X 1 , X 2 , Z)
reduces the possibilities forŷ 2 per WZ bin from 2
Eve ] which -by our choices -is exponentially large in all Case 2 regimes. Hence every WZ bin is possible in block j − 1, and so is every X 2,j .
As in Case 1, Term (18)(ii) = n(R 1 +R 1 ). Since R 2 < I(X 2 ; Z), andR 1 ≈ I(X 1 ; Z|X 2 ), and since block B does not contribute, the RHS of inequality (21b) becomes
). Now we need only show that:
) is "small". ∵ R 2 < I(X 2 ; Z), conditioning on Z j enables Eve to decode X 2,j correctly whp using (x 2,j , z j ) ∈ T (n) ǫ . Given W j , the number of possibilities for X 1,j reduces from
. Knowing both X 2,j and Z j enables Eve to decode X 1,j using (
at a rate I(X 1 ; Z|X 2 ), which suffices, sinceR 1 
In (4),
Terms (5)
(Foregoing evaluated in main text). We can write:
In (8),
(=0, for the same reason as Term (5)
Consider an individual block j = 1, 2, . . . , B − 1. We can lower bound
From (3), we have H(X
Above and (2) give H(
where in the summation above, we have replaced B ← B − 1, using the fact that since no new message is transmitted in block B, X 1,B is fixed beforehand and known to all parties, and so the last block's contribution is zero.
virtually identical to Case 2(a) and is omitted.
As in Case 2(b)(i), neither Bob nor Eve can decodeŷ 2 . Our choice of R 2 < I(X 2 ; Y 3 ) ensures that Bob can decode x 2 . Since both R 2 > I(X 2 ; Z)andR > I(X 2 ; Z) + W Z Eve , Eve cannot decode x 2 uniquely. Whether Eve decodes x 2 nonuniquely or treats it as noise depends on two further sub-cases, depending on whether I(X 2 ; Y 3 ) < or > I(X 2 ; Z|X 1 ). Expanding by the chain rule, term (21b)(b)
. W j in the conditioning reduces the possibilities for X 1,j from 2 n[R1+R1] → 2 nR1 . There are 2 nR2 possibilities for X 2,j . Conditioning on Z j reduces the possibilities for the pair (X 1,j , X 2,j ) from 2 n[R1+R2] → 2 n[R1+R2−I(X1,X2;Z)] . So we have:
Using this in (21b), and since R 2 > I(X 2 ; Z) and block B does not contribute, we obtain:
Term (17)(a) is a summation. We expand each individual term T j of (17)(a) by the chain rule:
Using (see main text)
where the last equality in (19) holds for the same reason as in the evaluation of Term (5)(c) , i.e., channel is DMC.
Together with (18), the above gives T j = nR 2 + n[
Using (11), (20) in (17), re-arranging slightly, and with appropriate algebra, we obtain the inequality: It remains to be proven that our scheme achieves a higher secrecy rate than [1] . NF achieves secrecy improvement by attacking both Bob and Eve. Since Eve is affected more, Bob's secrecy rate can improve in certain regimes. In our scheme, Alice has greater control over the relay's channel codeword in the next block. Our scheme's decoding delay of two blocks is to be preferred to [1] 's backward decoding delay of B blocks. Lastly, our MBEq calculation is, besides [6] by the author, one of the first of its kind -all other MBEq calculations, such as [7] , to the best of our knowledge, were made in the context of LM-NNC without WZ binning. Thus our equivocation calculations may be of independent interest. The next problem to be tackled is the four node dedicated relay broadcast channel with mutual secrecy requirement where the relay is "strong" with respect to one receiver and decode-forwards its intended message, and "weak" (or possibly untrusted) wrt the other receiver, and applies a version of compress-forward to its intended message. We foresee substantial technical challenges, but believe the effort will be worth it.
VII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author is grateful for the support of the Bharti Centre for Communication, IIT Bombay.
